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THE NONCITATION RULE AND THE
CONCEPT OF STARE DECISIS
DAVID L. WALTHER*
LNTRODUCON
A number of jurisdictions have been concerned with the
increasing flow of appellate decisions. To reduce the volume of
literature which must be reviewed by a researcher, many juris-
dictions have adopted standards for the selective nonpublica-
tion of appellate opinions.1 Because of this procedure a ques-
tion arises whether such unpublished opinions constitute
precedent and whether they may or should be cited by appel-
late counsel or by the court.2 Amidst the chaos observed in
those jurisdictions that have proscribed the citation of unpub-
lished opinions, 3 Wisconsin has adopted a noncitation rule for
its new court of appeals.4
THE NONPUBLICATION RULE
In 1971, the Federal Judicial Center brought together a
group of lawyers, teachers and judges who, with the National
Center for State Courts, formed the Advisory Council on Ap-
pellate Justice which, in 1973, recommended standards for
publication of judicial opinions in American jurisdictions.' In
making its recommendation, the Council stated its objective to
* B.S. 1958, J.D; 1961, Marquette University; member, Appellate Practice and
Procedure Committee, Wisconsin Judicial Council; member of Wisconsin Bar Associa-
tion.
1. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 976 (1978). England has long had the practice of selective
nonpublication. See M. PlicE & H. BrrNER, EFrwrrv LGAL Rzs mcH 284-85 (1953);
D. Meador, Criminal Appeals: English Practices and American Reforms 100 n.1 (1973).
2. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61
A.B.A.J. 1224 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gardner]; Kanner, The Unpublished Ap-
pellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Kanner]; Leavitt, The Yearly Two Foot Shelf: Suggestions for Changing Our Review-
ing Court Procedures, 4 PAc. L.J. 1 (1973); Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported
Cases in California, 24 HAsunmGs L.J. 37 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Seligson & Warn-
loft.
3. See Gardner, supra note 2.
4. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 187, § 112 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. § 752.41); Wis. Sup.
Ct. Order, 83 Wis. 2d xxvii, xlv-xlvi (1978) (to be codified as Wis. R. ApP. P. 809.23).
5. Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions (A Report of the Committee on
Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice) (Federal
Judicial Center Research Series No. 73-2) (Aug. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Stand-
ards].
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be the reduction of "the publication of appellate opinions that
are without general significance to the public, to the legal pro-
fession, or to advancing the functions of the law."8 Under the
Council's standards, the nonpublication determination was to
be made by the judge who decided the case.7 Thereafter, in
1977, the American Bar Association Commission on Standards
of Judicial Administration published similar standards relat-
ing to nonpublication of judicial opinions.' Under the ABA
standards, the mechanism for triggering publication was also
dependent upon the author of the opinion, although a concur-
ring or dissenting justice could compel publication of the ma-
jority opinion.'
6. Id. at 5.
7. "The Model Rule on Publication of Judicial Opinions" reads as follows:
1. Standard for Publication
An opinion of the (highest court) or of the (intermediate court) shall not
be designated for publication unless:
a. The opinion establishes a new rule or law or alters or modifies an
existing rule; or
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
2. Opinions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges
participating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in
section (1) of this rule is satisfied. Concurring opinions shall be published only
if the majority opinion is published. Dissenting opinions may be published if the
dissenting judge determines that a standard for publication as set out in section
(1) of this rule is satisfied. The (highest court) may order any unpublished
opinion of the (intermediate court) or a concurring or dissenting opinion in that
court published.
3. If the standard for publication as set out in section (1) of the rule is satisfied
as to only a part of an opinion, only that part shall be published.
4. The judges who decide the case shall consider the question of whether or not
to publish an opinion in the case at the conference on the case before or at the
time the writing assignment is made, and at that time, if appropriate, they shall
make a tentative decision not to publish.
Id. at 22-23.
8. ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JunIcmLA AnMIbmSTRATxON, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING To APPELLATE Couars § 3.37 (Approved Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA
STANDARDS].
9. Id. The American Bar Association standards provide in part:
3.37 Publication of Opinions.
(a) Public Access. Opinions of an appellate court should be a matter of
public record. Parties should be provided copies of a decision or opinion
when it is filed, even if general dissemination is witheld [sic] until the
opinion is in printed form.
(b) Formal Publication. An opinion of an' appellate court should be
published in the series of printed volumes in which the opinions of the
court appear only if, in the judgment of the judges participating in the
decision, it is one that:
[Vol. 61:581
NONCITATION RULE
In California the adoption of a nonpublication rule resulted
in the nonpublication of seventy-one percent of the opinions of
the court of appeals in fiscal year 1971.1 Thus, in that year,
more than two-thirds of appellants' counsel in California pre-
sented cases to the court of appeals which the court determined
not to be of publishable quality. The conclusion is inescapable
that in California counsel are either presenting frivolous ap-
peals or the court is inappropriately withholding opinions from
publication. In discussing the history of the California rule, one
commentator noted that,
The fond hope that non-publication under Rule 976(b)
would remove from the reports only the cut-and-dried, old-
hat reiterations of familiar rules, unworthy of researching or
even occupying lawyers' library shelf space, has in applica-
tion proved to be unjustified. Imbedded in the bulk of unpub-
lished opinions is a not-inconsiderable body of law dealing
with novel points and giving rise to conflicts among decisions.
Whether this is a result of judicial ineptitude, or a manifesta-
tion of momentary lapses, or a desire to hide from general
view decisions whose authors-for one reason or another-do
not wish bruited about, is as unimportant as it is unfathoma-
ble.
What is important is that Rule 976(b) has generated a
climate in which no litigant can be certain that his case will
be decided by the Court of Appeal in accordance with princi-
ples of law followed in other, similar cases.11
In creating the new Wisconsin Court of Appeals, the legisla-
ture provided:
(1) In each case, the court of appeals shall provide a
written opinion containing a written summary of the reasons
for the decision made by the court.
(2) Officially published opinions of the court of appeals
shall have statewide precedential effect.
(1) Establishes a new rule of law, alters or modifies an existing rule,
or applies an established rule to a novel fact situation;
(2) Involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
(3) Criticizes existing law; or
(4) Resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
A concurring or dissenting opinion should be published if its author be-
lieves it should be; ff such an opinion is published the majority opinion
should be published as well.
Id. § 3.37(a)-(b).
10. Seligson & Warnlof, supra note 2, at 37.
11. Kanner, supra note 2, at 442-43 (footnote omitted).
1978]
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(3) The supreme court shall determine by rule the man-
ner in which the court of appeals determines which of its
decisions shall be published. 2
Pursuant to this statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted Rule 809.23 which states, in part:
(1) CRITERIA FOR PUBLICATION
(a) Criteria for publication in the official reports of an
opinion of the court include whether the opinion:
1. enunciates a new rule of law or a modification of an
old rule;
2. applies an established rule of law to a factual situa-
tion significantly different from that in published opinions;
3. resolves a conflict between prior decisions of the
court; or
4. decides a case of substantial public interest.
(b) An opinion should not be published when:
1. the issues involve no more than the application of
well-settled rules of law to a recurring fact situation;
2. the issue asserted is whether the evidence is sufficient
to support the judgment, and the briefs show the evidence is
sufficient; or
3. the disposition of the appeal is clearly controlled by a
prior holding of the court or a higher court, and no reason
appears for questioning or qualifying the holding.
(2) DECISION ON PUBLICATION
The judge or judges of the Court of Appeals who join in
an opinion in an appeal or other proceeding shall make a
recommendation on whether the opinion should be pub-
lished. A committee composed of the chief judge and one
judge from each district of the Court of Appeals selected by
the Court of Appeals judges of each district shall determine
whether an opinion is to be published.'3
The reason for the adoption of the rule was best explained
by the Judicial Council Committee which noted that, "The
trend toward nonpublication of opinions is nationwide and re-
sults from the explosion of appellate court opinions being writ-
ten and published. Many studies of the problem have con-
cluded that unles the number of opinions published each year
is reduced legal research will become inordinately time-
12. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 187, § 112 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. § 752.41).
13. Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 83 Wis. 2d xxvii, xlv-xlvi (1978) (to be codified as Wis.
R. App. P. 809.23(l)-(2)).
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consuming and expensive. 1"
As noted in the Committee's Notes, Rule 809.23 adopts a
practice which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has already been
using in response to its previously unmanageable case load. 15
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently' granted
summary reversal of a Milwaukee County Circuit Court deci-
sion"6 in which a previously uninterpreted provision of the Wis-
consin open meeting statute7 was involved. In that case of first
impression, the court overruled the circuit court and adopted
a ruling in favor of a closed meeting. The court then sheltered
its opinion from jurisprudential currency and further judicial
scrutiny by ruling that the decision had no precedential value
and was not to be cited as- authority. Surely many other such
skeletons also lie buried by the rules of nonpublication and
noncitation.
THE NONCrrATION RuLE
Rules allowing nonpublication of opinions create a real dif-
ficulty with respect to whether such opinions may be cited as
authority. The American Bar Association Commission ap-
proach allows citation only if the opposing party and the court
is given prior notice of the contents of the opinion.
(c) Citation of Opinions Not Formally Published. Rules
of court should provide that an opinion which is not formally
published may be cited before a court only if the person mak-
ing reference to it provides the court and opposing parties
with a copy of the opinion or otherwise gives them reasonable
advance notice of its contents.18
The Advisory Council standards resolved this issue by for-
bidding any judicial citation of nonpublished opinions.
5. All opinions that are not found to satisfy a standard for
publication as prescribed by section (1) of this rule shall be
marked, Not Designated for Publication. Opinions marked,
Not Designated for Publication, shall not be cited as prece-
dent by any court or in any brief or other materials presented
to any court.'
14. 83 Wis. 2d at xlvi.
15. Id.
16. Gottlieb v. Doyne, 68 Wis. 2d 786 (1975) (unpublished, per curiam).
17. Wi. STAT. § 66.77(3)(d) (1971).
18. ABA ST mDAIS, supra note 8, § 3.37(c).
19. Standards, supra note 5, at 23. The reasons for the noncitation rule stated by
19781
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One court has gone so far as to state that "we will not
ourselves in published opinions cite or refer to memorandum
decisions."2 Of course, no provision can require the appellate
court itself to forget that it may have already rendered a deci-
sion on any given issue. One author wonders the extent to
which "there exists a 'grapevine' among appellate judges and
their research attorneys, whereby earlier unpublished opinions
are relied on expressly or implicitly. 21
The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the noncitation rule
by providing that, "An unpublished opinion is of no preceden-
tial value and for this reason may not be cited in any court of
this state as precedent or authority, except to support a claim
of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. 2 2 As a
safeguard against mistaken nonpublication decisions, the court
provided further that, "A person may at any time file a motion
in the court to have an unreported opinion published in the
official reports."'
The reasons given for adopting the noncitation rule in Wis-
consin were set forth in the Judicial Council Committee's Note.
There are several reasons why an unpublished opinion
should not be cited: (1) the type of opinion written for the
benefit of the parties is different from an opinion written for
publication and often should not be published without sub-
stantial revision; (2) if unpublished opinions could be cited,
services that publish only unpublished opinions would soon
develop forcing the treatment of unpublished opinions in the
same manner as published opinions thereby defeating the
the Advisory Council were:
1. It is unfair to allow counsel, or others having special knowledge of an unpub-
lished opinion, to use it if favorable and withhold it if unfavorable.
2. Cost will be reduced by eliminating the need to obtain and examine the
mass of opinions that are not designated for publication.
3. The absence of a non-citation rule would encourage the inclusion in opinions
not designated for publication of facts and details of reasoning, thus frustrating
the purposes underlying non-publication.
4. Cost and delay of cases appealed only because they are apparently at odds
with unpublished opinions, can be reduced.
5. Great difficulty, if not impossibility, would be involved in determining
whether an unpublished opinion has been overruled.
Id. at 19.
20. Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465 F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972).
21. Kanner, supra note 2, at 436 n.11.
22. Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 83 Wis. 2d xxvii, xlvi (1978) (to be codified as Wis. R.
APP. P. 809.23(3)).
23. Id. at xlvi (to be codified as Wis. R. APP. P. 809.23(4)).
[Vol. 61:581
NONCITATION RULE
purpose of nonpublication; (3) permitting the citation of un-
published opinions gives an advantage to a person who knows
about the case over one who does not; (4) an unpublished
opinion is not new authority but only a repeated application
of a settled rule of law for which there is ample published
authority.24
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE
The Wisconsin rule establishes a system for determining
publication not found in either the Advisory Council's or the
American Bar Association's recommendations. Rule 809.23(2)
creates a committee, composed of the chief judge and one judge
from each district of the court of appeals, to make the decision
as to publication.2 By virtue of Rule 809.23(3), only published
opinions are given precedential value or may be cited.26 In a
court as small as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, this commit-
tee, no doubt, will have intramural and nonofficial notice of
conflicts in unpublished opinions by the various panels. Thus,
elimination of chaotic appellate decisions is purchased at the
price of the creation of a committee with the power to deter-
mine which of the decisions of the court will, by statute,-* have
statewide controlling precedential effect upon the entire court
of appeals. Thus, the committee becomes a super tribunal,
unempowered by the Wisconsin Constitution and unendorsed
by the legislature.
The new appeal statutes adopted by the legislature and
the rules adopted by the supreme court 9 were derived from the
work product of the specially appointed Judicial Council Ap-
pellate Practice and Procedure Committee0 whose report on
the rules was approved by the statutory membership of the
Judicial Council on January 27, 1978.31 The noncitation rule
24. 83 Wis. 2d at xlvi-xlvii.
25. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
26. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
27. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 187, § 112 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. § 752.41).
28. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 187, § 112 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. ch. 752).
29. Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 83 Wis. 2d xxvii, xxxi (1978) (to be codified as WiS. STAT.
ch. 809).
30. "The Judicial Council Appellate Practice and Procedure Committee was
formed in February, 1976, and consisted of seven members appointed by the Judicial
Council and eight by this Court." Supreme Court Hearing on April 10: In the Matter
of Promulgation of Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure For the State of




was discussed by this committee with the opposing position
being freely expressed. However, there was neither time nor
opportunity for a full review of the materials which had been
published on this narrow issue. There are no public records
indicating the extent to which the legislature or the court ex-
amined this issue prior to the adoption of the recommended
statutes and rules, if such an examination took place at all.
The legislature did not expressly authorize the court to
adopt a noncitation rule, albeit the power to do so is inherent
with the court. Since the legislature has expressly authorized
the supreme court to determine how publication of the deci-
sions of the court of appeals shall be made,3 the court thus has
the power to revise rules which it has adopted. As experience
with the noncitation rule grows, this, no doubt, will be an issue
to which the Wisconsin Supreme Court will be compelled to
devote attention. As the committee itself noted, "Some argue
that even accepting the premise that a court may properly
decide not to publish an opinion this should not prevent that
opinion from being cited as precedent since in common law
practice any decision of a court is by its nature precedent."
THE CONCEPT OF STAR DECISIS
In Justice on Appeal, Professors Carrington, Meador and
Rosenberg, distinguished scholars of appellate procedure, state
that:
Experience with the no-citation rule suggests that it raises
difficulties that are as distressing as the problems that non-
publication is designed to overcome. A no-citation rule may
prevent counsel from urging by name an unpublished deci-
sion as a binding or authoritative precedent. But the rule will
not prevent counsel from trying to divine the reasoning of
that decision and then using it in the case at bar. Further, it
will not prevent wise counsel from attempting to insinuate its
existence and its persuasive force. After all, the reasoning
that led to the decision is imperishable, however mortal or
vanishing its printed form is said to be.
Experience in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit shows that trying to impose a non-precedent
status on decisions by declaring them non-citable is like at-
tempting to throw away a boomerang. The earlier decisions
32. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 187, § 112 (to be codified as Wis. STAT. § 752.41(3)).
33. Wis. Sup. Ct. Order, 83 Wis. 2d xxvii, xlvi (1978).
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keep coming back because of lawyers' and judges' ingrained
devotion to the force of stare decisis.u
Furthermore, at least three district courts within the Fourth
Circuit have continued to rely upon unpublished memorandum
decisions with one court stating that it would "continue to give
the appropriate weight to the memorandum decisions of the
Court of Appeals, regardless of form." 5
The noncitation rule may also leave the law in a state of
irremediable disarray since it prevents counsel from calling
attention to contradictory or chaotic decisions. For example,
Ninth Circuit opinions contain several cases dealing with the
proposition that government officers may stop individual vehi-
cles in certain circumstances for brief questioning or investiga-
tion where there is "founded suspicion."36 James Gardner, writ-
ing in the American Bar Association Journal, has found that
the Ninth Circuit panels are not only inconsistent on deciding
what facts are sufficient to constitute a "founded suspicion,"
but they are even in disagreement as to the threshold issue of
the review standard to be applied.37 Thus, the courts continue
to struggle with the question of whether the trial judge's deter-
mination is an issue of fact or an issue of law. Professors Car-
rington, Meador and Rosenberg argue that,
The conflict can be perceived only by looking at the unpub-
lished opinions, but because of the no-citation rule there is
no way to bring this to the surface and present the conflict
to the court for resolution. These conditions created by a no-
citation rule undermine one of the imperatives of an appel-
late system-that the system should promote uniform and
coherent enunciation and application of the law."
These authors further note the inherent risk of abuse by
judges who prefer to secrete some decisions which should be
published. The authors conclude "that the no-citation rule
34. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPAL 37 (1976)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as CARRINOTON].
35. Herndon v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 351 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (E.D. Va.
1972).
36. Compare United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1010 (1975) with United States v. Alvarez-Garcia, No. 74-2789 (9th Cir. Jan.
28, 1975).
37. Gardner, supra note 2, at 1226-27.
38. CARRINGTON, supra note 34, at 38 (footnote omitted).
39. "[W]e would only add a reference to United States v. Martinez, 530 F.2d 976
(5th Cir. 1976), an opinion which was published only after five members of the court
1978]
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has such undesirable side effects that it should be abandoned.
The absence of a no-citation rule means, in turn, that a non-
publication policy is undesirable and unworkable, for the rea-
sons mentioned above. Accordingly,. .. that policy too should
be abandoned.""'
Gideon Kanner in the California State Bar Journal has
warned that:
[S]tare decisis cannot operate as a "workable doctrine" as
long as courts, while adjudicating sets of identical facts, are
able to reach directly contrary results on diametrically op-
posed legal theories, by the simple expedient of publishing
one set of results but not the other. . . .[Sitare decisis...
means that we let the prior decision stand and control later,
similar cases. That means that the prior decision stands, and
not that the prior decision stands or falls depending on the
medium of its publication. Certainly where a litigant can
point to a prior adjudication of the very point in issue, how
can the court-in the name of stare decisis-refuse to con-
sider such precedent?
• ..[S]urely it is grossly unfair to gag a litigant who
wants to advise a Court of Appeal that the issue which he now
presents for adjudication has already been passed on, and
with what results.4'
There would, of course, be no reason for the rule of noncita-
tion were lawyers not otherwise tempted to cite unpublished
opinions. Why would lawyers persist in relying on unpublished
opinions? Gideon Kanner noted,
that unpublished opinions which truly comply with Rule
976(b) are largely not cited and thus pose no problem. It is
principally the novel but unpublished opinions that hold an
attraction to counsel in need of precedent. Otherwise, why
would any lawyer in his right mind go to the trouble of finding
and citing unpublished opinions which merely reiterate rules
and rely on precedents already larding the published
reports?"
Should not the question of whether opinions are to be given
currency be left, in our common law, adversary and free market
dissented from a denial of a petition for a rehearing en banc." CARINGTON, supra note
34, at 38 n.19.
40. Id. at 39.
41. Kanner, supra note 2, at 445-46 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
42. Id. at 446 n.75 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 61:581
NONCITATION RULE
system, to the judgment of the advocates? If so, what can be
done to unburden the already sagging bookshelves? Perhaps
"much could be done by way of increased self-discipline on the
part of appellate judges, both in terms of writing and editing
skills applied to their output, and through reduction of many
pointless distinctions enshrined in much of our law."' 3
Professors Carrington, Meador and Rosenberg propose a
solution particularly apt for a state with as manageable a body
of decisional law as Wisconsin." They suggest the use of memo-
randum decisions, the standards of which would overlap with
the standards for nonpublication, so that a memorandum deci-
sion would normally have little stare decisis value. The memo-
randa would not carry the name of an individual judge as au-
thor and would not display the full reasoning of the court. The
memorandum decisions would be published in a different fash-
ion and in a separate set of books, preferably in paperback on
low quality paper. They would therefore be generally available
and citable, but would be regarded as having fleeting signifi-
cance, except for the occasional gem which, if through contin-
ued use proved to have significance, could later be ordered
printed with the official reports. It should be noted that this
method of digesting circuit court opinions in the area of unem-
ployment compensation has been useful to the bar in Wiscon-
sin for many years.
In this era of widespread loss of faith in the government,
"This kind of disregard for the people's right and ability to
decide for themselves what aspects of their government's activ-
ities are worthy of their attention displays a regrettable lack of
understanding of the essence of a free society."'" Furthermore,
[N]on-publication inevitably reduces the visibility of the
correcting function of the appeal. Over time, it must depre-
ciate that basic function, leaving trial courts and administra-
tive agencies more on their own, and increasing general anxi-
ety about the integrity of the legal process at all levels. Visi-
bility is too important to too many of our imperatives to be
abandoned in favor of the limited benefits of non-
publication. 6
43. Id. at 447 n.78. See O'Connell, Streamlining Appellate Procedures, 56
JUDICATURE 234, 237-38 (1973).
44. CARRINGTON, supra note 34, at 39-41.
45. Kanner, supra note 2, at 448.




The noncitation rule is a fundamental departure from the
concept of stare dectsts and such a concept is so deeply rooted
in the common law that it should not be altered without more
thought, debate and argument than the issue has attracted to
date. The possible ramifications of the noncitation rule on Wis-
consin law and practice are incalculable, and as already indi-
cated many of the possible results may be detrimental. Thus
the adoption of Rule 809.23 should be the first step in a con-
tinumg debate as to the desirability of its demise.
Writing in the 1760s, the Italian jurist Cesare Becarria
concluded that the most significant factor behind Europe's
emergence from a dark age of lawless tyranny was not better
rulers, better judges, or even better laws. It was rather "the
art of printing, which makes the public, and not a few indi-
viduals, the guardians of the sacred laws.""7
47. Gardner, supra note 2, at 1227.
[Vol. 61:581
